



University of East London Institutional Repository: http://roar.uel.ac.uk  
 
This conference paper is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. 
Please scroll down to view the document itself. Please refer to the repository record 
for this item and our policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information. 
 
Author(s): Faulkner, Stéphane., Dehousse, Stéphane., Kolp, Manuel., Mouratidis, 
Haralambos., Giorgini, Paolo. 
Article Title: Delegation Mechanisms for Agent Architectural Design 
Year of publication: 2005 
Citation: Faulkner, S. et al. (2005) ‘Delegation Mechanisms for Agent Architectural 
Design’ Proceedings IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent 
Technology (IAT), Compiegne - France, pp. 503 – 507. 
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/IAT.2005.65 
DOI: 10.1109/IAT.2005.65 
 
Information on how to cite items within roar@uel: 
http://www.uel.ac.uk/roar/openaccess.htm#Citing  
 
Delegation Mechanisms for Agent Architectural Design 
 
Stéphane Faulkner1, Stéphane Dehousse1, Manuel Kolp2, Haralambos Mouratidis3 and Paolo 
Giorgini4 
 
1Information Management Research Unit 
 University of Namur,  
{stephane.faulkner, stephane.dehousse}@fundp.ac.be 
 
2Information System Unit, University of Louvain,  
kolp@isys.ucl.ac.be 
 
3School of Computing and Technology, University of East London 
haris@uel.ac.uk 
 
4Department of Information and Communication Technology 






Multi-agent Systems (MAS) are now being considered a 
promising architectural approach for designing 
collaborative information systems. In such a perspective, 
the concept of delegation has often been considered as a 
key concept for modeling cooperative behavior in MAS. 
However, despite considerable work on delegation 
mechanisms in MAS, few research efforts have aimed at 
truly defining a delegation model for designing MAS. This 
paper deals with this issue in defining the foundations for 
a delegation model aimed to help developers during the 





Collaborative information systems have been growing 
and gaining substance in technological infrastructure 
(e.g., middleware and Web technologies) and application 
areas (e.g., Business Process Management, e-Commerce, 
e-Government, and virtual enterprises). They involve 
large networks of information systems that manage large 
amounts of information and computing services and 
cooperate to fulfill their mission. 
In the last few years, one promising source of ideas for 
designing collaborative information systems is the field of 
multi-agent systems (MAS) architectures. They appear to 
be more flexible, modular, and robust than traditional 
including object-oriented ones. Research in this area has 
notably emphasized that MAS is conceived as a society of 
autonomous, collaborative, and goal-driven software 
components (agents).  
In such a distributed and cooperative perspective, the 
concept of delegation has often been considered as a key 
concept for modeling collaborative behavior in MAS [3, 
11, 14]. Delegation allows an agent to assign authority 
and/or responsibility for the execution of an action or the 
fulfillment of a goal. However, even if the concept of 
delegation has received increasing attention, the majority 
of researches have been focusing either on requirement 
analysis [7, 8] or on the definition of delegation models 
through communication acts [14, 17] or socio-cognitive 
theories [4].  
Few research efforts have aimed at truly defining 
delegation models for designing MAS architectures. This 
paper deals with this issue in defining a “core” set of 
concepts, including relationships and constraints that are 
fundamental to propose a delegation model. This model is 
aimed to help the developers during the design phase of 
collaborative MAS. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides 
an overview of the delegation model and details some 
concepts using the Z specification language. Section 3 
applies the delegation model on a case study. Section 4 
discusses some of the related work and Section 5 
summarizes the contributions of the paper and proposes 
some possible extensions. 
 
Figure 1. The delegation Model 
2. The Delegation Model 
 
 
Figure 1 depicts the Delegation Model using a UML 
type class diagram. An Agent is an intentional entity, 
which has some Beliefs and Goals that guide its action. A 
Belief defines current states about the MAS, while a Goal 
defines desired states that the Agent wants to bring about. 
Each Agent occupies one or more Roles that are a 
characterization of the expected behavior of an Agent in 
the MAS. A Role requires a set of Plans to fulfill the 
Goals for which it is responsible. A Plan defines a 
sequence of actions. 
In order to easier or better achieve its Goals, one or 
more Agents can delegate to another Agent, called the 
delegatee, the execution of a Plan or the responsibility of 
a Role (i.e., Responsibility). The Delegation of a plan can 
be classified as a Right or an Obligation. A Delegation of 
Right defines one or more Plans that the delegatee is 
allowed (or not) to execute, while a Delegation of 
Obligation defines Plans that the delegatee must execute. 
The Delegation can also be self-determined (i.e., Free), or 
imposed (i.e., Forced) by the context of the environment 
(i.e., Blind) or by other Agents (i.e., Coercive). In the 
case of Free Delegation, Agent requires Trust in the 
delegatee in order to effectively make the Delegation. 
Trust is a Belief an Agent has on the ability and the 
dependability of another agent to execute a Plan or to 
achieve a Goal. An agent can also be allowed to re-
delegate a given delegation to another agent. This kind of 
situation leads to a Chain of Delegation. 
A Delegation is trigged or stopped by an Event. An 
Event is an instantaneous state of the system. It is either 
output of a Plan, or exogenous to the system. 
Because Agents can collaborate autonomously, 
Delegation Inconsistencies may exist. A Delegation 
Inconsistency concerns two or more Delegations that 
cannot be assigned to the same Agent in the system. The 
resolution to a Delegation Inconsistency takes the form of 
new Delegations. 
Figure 1 shows only concepts and relationships. In the 
next sections, we specify attributes and constraints of 
some concepts using the Z state-based specification 
language [19]. Following UML to Z translation rules 
from Shroff and France [18], attributes are specified as Z 
state variables and constraints as Z predicates. However, 
due to a lack of space we only specify in details the 
concept of Delegation and its specializations (i.e., 
Responsibility, Right, Obligation, Free and Forced). 
 
 
2.1 Delegation and Chain of Delegation 
 
Figure 2 shows the Z formal specification of the 
Delegation concept. The first part of the specification 
represents the definition of types. A given type defines a 
finite set of items. The Delegation specification first 
defines the type Name (which represents the Name 
attribute) by writing [Name]. Such a declaration 
introduces the set of all names, without making 
assumptions about the type (i.e., whether the name is a 
string of characters and numbers, or only characters, 
etc.). 
More complex and structured types are defined with 
schemas. A schema groups a collection of related 
declarations and predicates into a separate namespace or 
scope. The schema in Figure 2 is entitled Delegation and 
is partitioned by a horizontal line into two sections: the 
declaration section above and the predicate section below 
the line. The declaration section introduces a set of 
variable declarations, while the predicate section provides 
predicates that constrain values of the variables. 
 
[Name] 
[Actor] := Agent | Agent Group 
[Value]  
 
     Delegation 
delegation_name :  Name 
delegator :  Actor 
delegatee : Actor 
trigger:  Event 
expiration : ℙ Event 
depth : Value 
linked_ delegation : Boolean 
monitor : Actor 
combined_with : Delegation j  Delegation 
name ≠ ∅ ∧ delegator ≠ ∅  ∧ delegatee ≠ ∅ ∧  
trigger ≠ ∅ 
dom depth = N 
disjoint„Responsibility, Right, ObligationÒ 
disjoint„Free, ForcedÒ 
A d1, d2: Delegation ● d1.combined_with = d2  
    ﬁ d2.delegator = d1.delegator ¶                   
         d2.delegatee = d1.delegatee  
A d1, d2: Delegation ● d1.combined_with = d2  ¶ 
    d1.expiration  
    ﬁ d2.expiration 
Figure 2. Delegation Concept 
A delegation defines an action by which an agent 
assigns to another agent the responsibility of a role, or the 
right or the obligation to execute a plan. It is specified 
with the following variables: 
 
− delegator and delegatee: the delegator identifies the 
actor initiating the delegation, while the delegatee 
identifies the actor to which the delegation has been 
assigned. An actor is either an agent or a group of 
agent. The concept of agent group allows modeling 
multiple delegations (i.e., delegation from a group of 
agent and/or delegation to a group of agent). An agent 
group is specified with two variables: leader and joint. 
The leader variable defines one or more agents that 
cannot leave the group without causing the extinction 
of the group, and consequently the revocation of the 
delegation. The joint variable determines whether all 
or only one agent of the group has to contribute to the 
fulfillment of the delegation 
− trigger and expiration: the trigger defines the reason 




− depth: defines restrictions on re-delegations. A depth 
set to 0 implies that no re-delegation is allowed, while 
a depth set to a value greater than 0 allows a chain of 
delegation composed of a number of re-delegations 
equivalent to the depth’s value. The depth attribute is 
particularly interesting in a chain of delegation [7, 11, 
12, 15] to control delegation propagation and avoid 
erratic re-delegation that could destabilize the system. 
− linked_delegation: specifies if the delegation stops its 
effects when the delegator leaves the system. This 
variable is useful to design open MAS architectures 
[9] in which agents can constantly integrate or leave 
the system. 
− monitor: identifies one or more agents that monitor 
the delegation. Monitoring is used in order to check 
and to evaluate the fulfillment of a delegation 
assigned to a trusted or distrusted agent. The act of 
monitoring can be done by the delegator himself or by 
other agents. Depending on the kind of delegation, a 
monitor is required or not. 
− combined_with: specifies if the delegation is 
combined with another delegation. By combining 
delegation of responsibility and delegation of 
obligation, an agent can delegate a role and force the 
execution of one or more plans in order to fulfill a 
goal for which this role is responsible. Such a 
combination is useful to constraint some agent’s 
behaviors in cooperative MAS. For instance, an agent 
may delegate to another agent a role with the goal get 
personal data and a delegation of obligation on the 
plan, encrypt the data. For the delegator, this ensures 
that whatever the plans used to get the personal data, 
they will be encrypted. 
 
A Delegation Chain is a non-empty set of delegations. 
The predicate section of the Chain schema specifies that 
all delegations which belong to the same chain have an 
identical value for their respective linked_delegation and 
combined_with variables, and that for each re-delegation 
the depth variable is decreased by 1. 
 
    Delegation Chain 
chain: ℙ  Delegation 
# delegations ≥ 2 
A d1 , d2 : Delegation, c : Chain  
    d1 e c ¶ d2 e c  
    ﬁ d1.linked_delegation =  d2.linked_delegation 
    ¶ d1.combined_with = d2.combined_with 
A d1 , d2 : Delegation,  c : Chain, x e N  
    d1 e c  ¶ d2 e c ¶ d1.delegatee = d2.delegator ¶ 
    d1.depth = x 
    ﬁ d2.depth = x - 1  
Figure 3. Chain of Delegation Concept 
 
2.2 Delegation of responsibility 
 
A delegation of responsibility defines a set of roles 
that the delegatee has to occupy. Roles provide the 
building blocks for agent social systems and the 
requirements by which agents interact [6]. The concept of 
role is important to abstractly model the agents in multi-
agent systems and helpful to manage its complexity 
without considering the concrete details of agents (e.g., 
implementation architectures and technologies) [18]. 
They enable separation between different functionalities 
of software agents (e.g., mobility from collaboration), or 
between different phases of the development process 
(e.g., functions in the design from methods in the 
implementation). 
A delegation of responsibility involves that the 
delegatee who has to occupy the roles is constrained to 
fulfill the goals for which the roles are responsible. 
However, the delegation of responsibility is the least 
restrictive kind of delegation. Indeed, it only constrains 
the delegatee to fulfill goals without constraining the 
selection or the execution of plans which will make 
possible to fulfill them. 
 
     Responsibility 
Delegation 
roles : ℙ Role 
roles ≠ ∅ 
Figure 4. Responsibility Delegation Concept 
 
2.3 Delegation of right 
 
A delegation of right defines a set of plans that the 
delegatee is allowed to execute. It is specified in Figure 5. 
This definition allows the representation of the concept of 
authorization or permission [4, 7, 10, 12] that are often 
described in the literature. An authorization is defined as 
the right to grant to an agent an access to a resource in the 
system. In our case, this kind of authorization can be 
modeled by a delegation of right on the plan with which 
the resource is associated. For instance, the authorization 
on a personal data resource can be modeled as a 
delegation of right on the plan which accesses to the 
personal data. 
 
    Right 
Delegation 
plans : ℙ Plan 
plans ≠ ∅ 
Figure 5. Right Delegation Concept 
 
 
2.4. Delegation of obligation 
 
A delegation of obligation defines a set of plans that 
the delegatee must (or not) execute. It is specified in 
Figure 6. The polarity variable describes whether the 
obligation is positive or negative. A negative delegation 
of obligation enables an agent to forbid another agent to 
execute a plan. It corresponds to the notion of prohibition 
[7]. 
[Obligation_polarity] := Positive | Negative 
 
    Obligation 
Delegation 
polarity: Obligation_Polarity 
plans : ℙ Plan 
polarity  ≠ ∅  ∧  plan ≠ ∅ 
A ob: Obligation, p : Plan 
p e ob ∧ ob.expiration ﬁ p.executed  
Figure 6. Obligation Delegation concept 
 
2.5. Forced Delegation 
 
Delegation is generally strictly based on trust. 
However, [4, 8] has mentioned rarer cases of delegation 
where trust is not required. This kind of delegation is 
called a forced delegation. It occurs when an agent is in a 
situation of blind or coercive delegation [4].  
A blind delegation occurs when the delegator does not 
have sufficient information to form a trust opinion on the 
delegatee. Compare to other forms of delegation, a blind 
delegation requires a monitor in order to compensate the 
lack of trust in the delegatee. 
 
    Blind 
Delegation 
A bl: Blind ,  bl.monitor Î 0 
Figure 7. Blind Delegation Concept 
A coercive delegation implies one or more agents, 
called the requesters, that force the delegator to delegate 
the responsibility of a role or the execution of a plan. The 
requesters can force the delegation towards a given 
delegatee (i.e., full coercive delegation), or can only force 
the delegation without mentioning the delegatee (i.e., 
partial coercive delegation). 
 
[Status] := Full | Partial 
 
    Coercive 
Delegation 
requesters: ℙ Actor 
status: Status 
requesters ≠ 0 ¶ status ≠ 0 
Figure 8. Coercive Delegation Concept 
 
2.6 Free Delegation 
 
Contrary to the forced delegation, a free delegation 
requires trust in the delegatee. Indeed, a delegation 
implies that the delegator exposes himself through the 
behavior of a delegatee. A free delegation is defined as an 
intentional delegation (i.e., the delegator can freely 
decide to delegate or not). Consequently, the delegator 
decides to delegate only if it trusts the delegatee. 
 
    Free 
Delegation 
require : Trust 
Figure 9. Free Delegation Concept 
Trust is a belief an agent has on the ability and the 
dependability of another agent to execute a plan or to 
achieve a goal. The concept of trust is essentially human 
mental state and therefore difficult to transpose in the 
agent paradigm. Authors have, many times [3, 4, 13, 16], 
tried to formalize this concept through, for example, 
computation of different components without being able 
to achieve the definition of a universally admitted model. 
However, due to a lack of space, we do not address in 
this work the issues related to trust models. 
 
 
3. Using the Delegation Model in a Case 
Study 
 
The following examples are part of a substantial case 
study on the development of an open system that supports 
the management of paper submission and the reviewing 
process for a conference. We focus on the phase of 
reviewing which involves three categories of actors: PC 
Chair (PCC), PC Member (PCM) and Scientific Expert 
(SE). 
 
Example 1: The PCC distributes submitted papers for 
reviewing to the PCM. Each PCM have to select papers 
they agree to review. For selecting a paper, a PCM 
depends on PCC to get access to the submitted papers.  
 
The example suggests the use of a delegation of 
responsibility (Reviewing) from the PCC to the PCM 
about the role of “reviewer”. This delegation of 
responsibility is combined with the delegation of 
obligation to select a paper (Select Paper) and the 
delegation of right to access a paper (Accessing Paper).  
The rest of this section describes the mentioned 






delegator: PC Chair 
delegatee: P PC Member 
trigger: end_submission 
expiration: end_reviewing 




name: Select Paper 
delegator: PC Chair 







name: Accessing Paper 
delegator: PC Chair 
delegatee: P PC Member 
depth: 1 
trigger: end_submission 
linked_delegation = 1 
plans: Access 
 
We specify the plans Select Paper and Accessing 




reviewer : Paper  ß PC Member 
paper = dom reviewer 
 
Access 
list_paperkey : P PaperKey 
paper_to_review: PaperKey å Paper 
list_paperkey = dom paper_to_review 
 
Example 2: A PCM has to review a paper for which he 
has no enough expertise. The PCM chooses to delegate 
the review to a Scientific Expert with which he is not 
familiar.  
 
This example illustrates the situation of a chain of 
delegation. The chain of delegation concerns the right to 
execute the plan Access. This plan was delegated firstly 
by the PCC to the PCM and then by the PCM to the SE. 
This re-delegation is only possible if the first delegation 
have a depth attribute with a value greater than zero. As 
this re-delegation also corresponds to a blind delegation, 
we define the PCC like monitor. 
 
RightDelegation 
name: Accessing paper 
delegator: PC Member 
delegatee: Scientific Expert 
trigger: end_submission 
depth = 0 
linked_delegation = 1 
monitor: PC Chair 
plans: Access 
 
Example 3: The PCM cannot achieve the review of the 
selected paper because the author is a colleague. The 
PCM has to ask to a SE, designated by the PCC, to do the 
review of the paper. To make the review, the SE depends 
on the PCM to get access to the submitted papers.  
 
While the previous example illustrated a blind 
delegation, this one refers to a coercive delegation. 
Indeed, the PCC requests that the PCM delegates the 
reviewing of the paper to a specific SE. Therefore, this 
form of delegation corresponds to a full coercive 
delegation. In case of a partial coercive delegation, the 
PCM could have chosen himself the delegatee. 
 
RightDelegation 
name: Accessing paper 
delegator: PC Member 
delegatee: Scientific Expert 
trigger: end_submission 
depth = 0 
linked_delegation = 1 





4. Related work 
  
Giorgini et al. [8] in their attempt to model security 
requirements emphasize the distinction between 
delegation of execution, i.e. at-least delegation, and 
delegation of permission, i.e. at-most delegation. The 
model proposed in this work takes into account this 
distinction respectively through the concepts of 
delegation of obligation and delegation of right. 
Moreover, from the idea of Norman and Reed [15] that 
have argued for a theory of delegation on an action to be 
done and on a goal to be achieved, our model proposes 
the delegation of responsibility. Such a delegation 
constrains the delegatee which has to occupy the roles to 
fulfill the goals for which the roles are responsible. 
The concept of delegation chain has been largely 
discussed in the literature [7, 12, 15]. In addition, [8] 
mentions the combination of several delegations in order 
to deal with complex delegation behaviors. Our model 
allows specifying a chain, as well as a combination of 
delegations. Moreover, we add the concept of agent 
group in order to define multiple delegations (or 
sponsoring) [15]. 
Finally, Castelfranchi and Falcone mention [4] that in 
exceptional cases the delegator is not free to delegate. 
From this statement, we propose to distinct two classes of 
forced delegation: coercive and blind. The importance to 
handle forced delegation has been confirmed by [8] 
which recognize, after a large study, that for pragmatic 
reasons agents may be forced to delegate to agent they do 
not trust. 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
MAS constitute a highly promising software architectural 
approach for collaborative application domains such as 
peer-to-peer, information retrieval, semantic web services 
or e-business. The literature has often considered the 
concept of delegation as a key concept for modeling 
cooperative behavior in MAS [3, 11, 14]. 
Unfortunately, despite considerable work in software 
design and architecture during the last decade, few 
research efforts have aimed at defining a delegation 
model for designing collaborative mechanisms when 
MAS architectures are developed.  
This paper has attempted to gather the key points of 
different perspectives on delegation, as discussed in 
Section 4. It has defined a conceptual model to design 
delegation in MAS architectures. The main contribution 
of this work is that our approach aims at modeling 
delegation to use it at the design level, while others 
approaches focus on requirement analysis or on the 
definition of delegation models through communication 
acts or socio-cognitive theories. 
The research reported here calls for further work. We 
are currently working on: 
- the extension of the delegation model with trust 
management concepts; 
-  the specification of the delegation model according 
to a set of rules in order to perform consistency 
analysis to be included in verification tools such as 
PVS; 
- the identification of a suitable set of delegation 
abstractions, inspired by organizational metaphors, to 
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